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Abstract
We investigate the distribution of profits between a laboratory and two firms on the
intermediate market for cost-reducing or/and demand-enhancing technology, and infer im-
plications for the governance of R&D. The laboratory supplies tailor-made multi-dimensional
R&D services at some costs, and maximizes its individual profits. Firms are interested in
delegating the production of R&D services from a common laboratory, to whom they offer
contingent payment offers. On the final market for goods, firms compete in prices or in
quantities. We unveil mild sufficient conditions for the (non) appropriation of innovation
profits by the laboratory. Anti-complementarities in the dimensions of R&D services imply
that the laboratory appropriates some non-zero share of joint profits in all equilibria. In this
case, we show that each firm has strategic incentives to shift to a more integrated structure
by merging horizontally or by acquiring the laboratory. Complementarities in the develop-
ment dimensions imply that the laboratory exactly breaks even in all equilibria. In that
case, firms have no incentive to shift to a more integrated governance structure. A series of
specific algebraic forms, as borrowed from the literature, illustrate the broad applicability of
the results, and uncovers common features in seemingly unrelated representations of post-
innovation cost and demand conditions.
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1 Introduction
License agreements and cooperative R&D have received considerable attention in the theoreti-
cal literature. One stream of research considers a monopolistic laboratory which can license
a patented innovation to vertically related symmetric firms. Most contributions build on a
seminal model by Katz and Shapiro (1986), in which there is complete information, the in-
dependent laboratory incurs no cost, and addresses take-it-or-leave-it offers to two downstream
competitors, which are potential users of only one unit of the pre-formatted product they can-
not source in-house.1 Another stream of the literature concentrates on the comparison between
non-cooperative and cooperative R&D, in terms of innovative outputs, firms’ profits, and social
welfare. In a pioneering paper by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), duopolistic symmetric
firms invest in deterministic R&D, as supplied by a proprietary laboratory, obtain a unidimen-
sional cost-reducing process innovation, and benefit from a knowledge externality in the form
of technological spillovers. Extensions also examine non-cooperative and cooperative in-house
sourcing, either in each firm’s separate laboratory, or in a jointly owned laboratory with firms
sharing the operating costs.2 The literature can thus be summarized as focusing on two extreme
situations: either firms close down proprietary facilities and buy the finalized licensed output of
some past R&D activities from a specialized laboratory, or they share their own R&D efforts
with competitors in a cooperative agreement.
The starting point of this paper is that possibilities open to firms are not limited to these
polar cases. In many instances, real-world firms keep in-house resources and delegate the pro-
duction of tailor-made R&D services. They contract with an independent laboratory for the
completion of well specified tasks in exchange of a payment scheme.3 Studies in the history of
technology have documented this organizational choice as a long dating phenomenon that is
not limited to small firms lacking internal R&D laboratories. Whereas Teece (1988, p. 257)
remarks that “[d]uring the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century,
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American manufacturing firms bought an increasing share of R&D in-house,” Mowery (1990,
p. 347) observes that, “as in-house facilities grew in size and number during 1900-40, contract
research institutions increasingly complemented, rather than substituted for, in-house research.”
For recent years, the National Science Foundation reports an amount of contracted out R&D of
6,000 in 1997, 6,710 in 1998, and 9,240 in 1999 (in millions of dollars), in the U.S. Interestingly,
the data display unexplained inter-industry differences, as epitomized by the reported amount
of 2,274 by only 14 firms in the pharmaceuticals industry, against a reported amount of only
101 by 104 firms in the computer and electronic products industry, for the year 1999. And for
all industries, the largest firms (25,000 employees or more), which typically have proprietary
facilities available, display much larger amounts of contracted out R&D than all other firm-size
categories, with more than one third of the total for all three years.4
Beyond particularities of all kinds, a few stylized facts characterize the crux of R&D contract
circumstances: (i) R&D is not a deterministic activity, (ii) R&D is a multi-dimensional activity
which can yield varieties of firm-specific process or product applications, (iii) transfer payments
addressed by firms are functions of R&D efforts as decided at the laboratory level, (iv) large
oligopolistic firms which choose to contract for R&D services also own in-house facilities, and
(v) have more bargaining power than independent laboratories.5
To the best of our knowledge, most contributions to the theoretical literature ignore these
stylized facts, with the exception of two papers which focus on the first one. Aghion and Tirole
(1994) and Ambec and Poitevin (2001) examine the impact of the non-deterministic character
of R&D on the relative efficiency of a separated governance structure, in which a user buys an
innovation from an independent unit, and an integrated structure, in which the user sources
R&D internally.
Aghion and Tirole assume that an innovation is the uncertain outcome of some non con-
tractible effort, as performed by a laboratory and financed by a user. The laboratory and the
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user are risk-neutral profit maximizers. In an independent structure, the laboratory owns the
innovation and is endowed with the same bargaining power as the user. It first produces the
innovation, and then bargains over the licence fee to receive only some share of the total returns
on its effort. In an integrated structure, the user owns the innovation. The laboratory receives
no reward from innovation outcomes, thus provides no effort, while the user supplies the optimal
investment level. Property rights are allocated as a means of tackling the contract incomplete-
ness problem. As a result, independence (integration) dominates if the marginal efficiency of
the laboratory’s effort is large (small) enough relative to the marginal efficiency of the user’s
investment.
Ambec and Poitevin consider also a risky innovation process, with a risk-neutral user, but
with a risk-averse laboratory. They assume that contracts are complete, and introduce some in-
formational asymmetry. If the laboratory is an independent structure, it finances the innovation
from an external source, and sells it to the user. When profits are nonobservable to external
financiers, the ability of the financial contract to diversify innovation risk is reduced. Alterna-
tively, in an integrated structure, the user finances and hierarchically controls the production
of the innovation in its own laboratory, before exploiting it some way. The laboratory and the
user are linked by a hierarchical relationship, which is structured by an employment contract,
and subject to renegotiation. It is demonstrated that the relative efficiency of the two structures
depends on the correlation between the cost of developing the innovation and its market value.
The independent (integrated) structure dominates when the correlation is positive (negative).
Remark that these two models fundamentally differ in their theoretical use of the non-
deterministic R&D assumption. The first one emphasizes the non-contractibility of the uncertain
R&D outcome. The second one stresses an informational problem as attached to the risky nature
of R&D tasks. However, a common characteristic of the two models is the assumption that there
is only one user. The main features of our contribution appear clearly when compared with
the latter two contributions. We rule out uncertainty, and capture all other stylized facts in a
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common agency model. The objective is to investigate situations in which two rival firms (defined
as principals) are interested in delegating the production of R&D services from a common
laboratory (defined as an agent), in order to gain access to superior abilities, or to benefit from
economies of scale.6 This laboratory is independent and therefore retains complete control over
all R&D effort dimensions for the supply of firm-specific innovative services. It does not benefit
from any informational asymmetry and can thus appropriate innovation benefits exclusively
from the competition between firms through their individual payment offers. This allows us to
isolate the effect of strategic interactions between delegating firms on the size and distribution
of R&D profits for classes of process or/and product multi-dimensional innovations, and with
price or quantity competition on the final market. We then uncover structural conditions on
the nature of R&D services, under which the choice by firms to contract out is as profitable as
relying on proprietary facilities. The resulting incentives to parties to shift to a more integrated
form of governance are examined in turn.
The gist of the paper is that externalities, in the supply of technology, impact the intensity
of competition between potential users for the purchase of tailor-made R&D services. Two types
of externalities are at play. Externalities are of the indirect type when the laboratory’s costs
are not additively separable across users. If the cost of satisfying a firm’s requirements depends
on the level of efforts provided to meet another firm’s needs, then firms interact through their
respective specifications and associated payments. Externalities can be also of the direct type if
each firm’s gross profit function depends not only on the R&D services it receives, but also on
the services received by another firm. This occurs, for example, when R&D results are not fully
appropriable by users, and give rise to inter-firm spillovers.7 Intuitively, negative externalities
make competition tougher (the “conflict” case), whereas positive externalities make it softer (the
“cooperation” case), on the market for R&D services. Whether competition is relatively tough
or soft is reflected by each firm’s payment offers, and thus drives the distribution of innovation
benefits between the laboratory and firms. In turn, the distribution of benefits impacts firms’
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incentives to merge horizontally, or to acquire the laboratory.
More specifically, we build the analysis of the interaction between the laboratory and firms
on a recent theoretical contribution by Laussel and Le Breton (2001), and extensions by Billette
de Villemeur and Versaevel (2002). In technical terms, this is done by associating a charac-
terization of the highest joint profits v(S), as obtained by the laboratory and a subset S of
contracting firms, to the laboratory’s ability to appropriate a share of total R&D benefits, and
with delegating firms’ equilibrium profits. We show that, when v reflects anti-complementarities
in R&D dimensions, the laboratory appropriates some non-zero share of total innovation profits.
Alternatively, we demonstrate that, when v reflects complementarities in R&D dimensions, the
laboratory does not appropriate innovation profits. We display two sets of mild conditions, on
the algebraic forms taken by the laboratory’s cost function and by firms’ gross profit functions,
that are sufficient for either anti-complementarities or complementarities in R&D dimensions
to prevail. The findings are exemplified in a series of contrasted specifications of the model, as
borrowed from a variety of contributions to the industrial organization literature.
Clear implications are obtained for the industrial organization of R&D, either by an inde-
pendent laboratory and distinct users, or in an integrated structure — when firms either merge
horizontally, or acquire the external laboratory. It is found that, when anti-complementarities
prevail, firms which delegate R&D to the laboratory have strategic incentives to shift to a more
integrated form of governance. Horizontal integration of firms eliminates competition on the
market for R&D services, and thus dries up the laboratory’s source of profits. Vertical integra-
tion of the laboratory, with one of the two firms, permits the merged entity to ask the outsider
a premium for the negative externalities it imposes by receiving R&D services. However, when
complementarities dominate, delegating firms have no strategic incentive to shift to a more in-
tegrated structure, because they already appropriate all profits. This clear-cut opposition holds
in the absence of efficiency gains or transaction costs, as specifically associated to particular
governance structures.
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The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we specify the assumptions of a three-stage
R&D delegation game. In section 3, we display two general propositions that give sufficient
conditions for the (non) appropriability of (some share of) joint benefits by the laboratory.
In section 4, we offer two propositions and several examples that facilitate the identification
of specific algebraic forms of the laboratory’s cost function, and of each firm’s gross profit
function, for which profits are appropriable (or not) by the laboratory. In section 5, we examine
the incentives for firms to shift to a more integrated form of governance, either by merging
horizontally or by acquiring the laboratory. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Two stages are related in a decentralized intermediate market for technology. Upstream, a set of
independent laboratories supply cost-reducing or/and demand-enhancing R&D services.8 Down-
stream, two firms produce and sell a (possibly differentiated) good on a final market, and maxi-
mize individual profits either in prices or in quantities. Laboratories have less bargaining power
than firms, because the number of laboratories is larger than the number of firms, or firms have
the capacity to source new technology from proprietary facilities. Information is complete, in
the sense that firms have all relevant information, whereas the laboratory needs not to know
downstream cost and demand conditions. We assume also that the two firms are interested
in outsourcing R&D from the same laboratory — singularized hereafter by the subscript 0 —
in order, say, to obtain economies of scale, or to tap differentiated resources. Each firm i in
N = {1, 2} is interested in controlling the selection by the laboratory of services that fit its own
specificities. There are 0, 1, or 2 contracting pairs on the intermediate market for R&D. The
vector x = (x1,x2) describes the two multi-dimensional and firm-specific R&D services supplied
by the laboratory. If no firm contracts, then x = 0; otherwise x > 0.
We specify a common agency game, in which the laboratory (a single agent) selects the R&D
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services which affect its own costs as well as the gross profits earned by the two firms (principals).
In extensive form, at stage 1, the two firms i = 1, 2 simultaneously apply for the adoption of
xi by offering non-negative contingent transfers ti(x) in Ti = {ti(x) ∈ R1+ : x ∈ X} to the
laboratory; at stage 2, given t(x) = (t1(x), t2(x)), the laboratory maximizes its own profits by
supplying R&D services x∗ = (x∗1,x
∗
2); at stage 3, given x
∗, each firm i maximizes individual
profits in yi on the final market.
Firm i’s received R&D services xi = (x1i , . . . , x
d
i ) are in Xi, a sublattice of R
d
+, with i = 1, 2,
d ≥ 1, and X = X1 × X2.9 The function f : X → R1+ represents the laboratory’s costs, and
is continuous in x. The function gi : X × R2+ → R1+ represents firm i’s gross profits, and is
continuous in x and in y = (y1, y2), with yi = pi, qi, that is a price (Bertrand competition on the
final market) or a quantity (Cournot competition). Henceforth we denote the common agency
game by Γ = [X, f(x), {gi(x,y)}i=1,2].
In this set-up, R&D services can lead either to a cost reduction in the production of the final
good (process innovation), or/and to higher demand satisfaction for final consumers (product
innovation). The nature of the innovation is reflected by the functional form of post-adoption
cost and demand components, as follows.
¥ Process innovation. The cost function is non-increasing in xi, all xj , qi, that is
ci(x00i ,xj , qi) ≤ ci(x0i,xj , qi), for all x00i ≥ x0i, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Revenues are ri(yi), i.e. process
innovations impact costs only.
¥ Product innovation. The revenue function is non-decreasing in xi, all xj ,y, that is
ri(x00i ,xj ,y) ≥ ri(x0i,xj ,y), for all x00i ≥ x0i, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Costs are ci(qi), i.e. product
innovations impact demand only.
Note that, in this paper, an innovation that results from R&D services is not limited to the
latter polar cases. It can impact both cost and demand conditions.
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The laboratory’s net profit function is
v0(x) =
X
i∈N
ti(x)− f(x). (1)
Each firm i’s net profit function is
vi(x) = gi(x)− ti(x), (2)
where gi(x) = gi(x,y∗(x)) is firm i’s gross concentrated profit, a function of x, with y∗(x) =
(y∗1(x), y
∗
2(x)). Figure 1 illustrates the set-up. Remark that, in the expressions of profits (1) and
(2), all R&D costs are borne by the laboratory, whereas the production costs are incurred by
firms only.10.
[insert figure 1 here]
An equilibrium of Γ is described by the three-tuple (x∗,y∗, t∗). It is a Truthful Subgame-
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (TSPNE), if and only if:
a) for all i, a strategy t∗i is truthful relative to x
∗
i , that is:
either vi(x) = vi(x
∗), or vi(x) < vi(x
∗) and t∗i (x) = 0, all x;
b) the pair (x∗, t∗) is a Nash equilibrium, that is:
x∗ ∈ X(t∗) = argmax
x∈X
v0(x), and
there is no i ∈ N , no ti : X → R1+, and no x ∈ X(ti, t∗j ), such that vi(x) > vi(x∗);
c) the vector y∗ is a Nash equilibrium, that is:
vi(x∗, y∗i (x
∗), y∗j (x
∗)) ≥ vi(x∗, yi, y∗j (x∗))), all yi.
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The concept of truthfulness can be made more intuitive by observing that it simply imposes
the difference in transfer payments t∗i (x)− t∗i (x∗) to exactly reflect the corresponding difference
in individual gross profits, as obtained by firm i, when it receives x in lieu of x∗. Bernheim and
Whinston (1986) demonstrated two central properties in favour of the use of this refinement in
common agency models. First, for any set of payment offers by i = 1, 2, the other principal
j’s best-response correspondence contains a truthful strategy. Therefore a principal can restrict
itself to using truthful strategies. Second, all truthful Nash equilibria are coalition-proof. In this
two-principal set-up, this means that total net profits, as obtained by firms in a truthful subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium, are higher than in any other subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. In this
paper, all results relate to truthful subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (referred to as “equilibria”
for simplicity in the following sections).
For all Γ, define the highest joint profits for the laboratory and the contracting firms
vΓ(S) = max
x∈X
ÃX
i∈S
gi(x)− f(x)
!
, (3)
where S ∈ 2N denotes all possible subsets of N , including the empty set. We impose vΓ(∅) = 0
(a normalization), and reckon that, for each firm, participation in the intermediate market for
technology is constrained by vi ≥ vi. Remark that v1, v2 can be interpreted as reservation profits
obtained either by sourcing substitutable R&D services from another independent and exclusive
laboratory, or by relying on in-house capabilities. The latter interpretation is favoured in the
following, for simplicity.11
We can now characterize the distribution of profits (accruing from the production of R&D
services) between the laboratory and the two firms for different structural specifications of vΓ,
as follows.
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3 Joint Profits Maximization and Distribution
The following two propositions establish that the laboratory’s equilibrium supply of R&D ser-
vices maximizes joint profits, and give the range of net equilibrium joint profits obtained by the
two firms.12
Proposition 1 (joint profits maximization) In all TSPNE, the R&D services x∗ supplied
by the laboratory are in
X∗ = argmax
x∈X
ÃX
i∈N
gi(x)− f(x)
!
. (4)
Proposition 1 says that, as far as the laboratory and firms are concerned, the equilibrium R&D
outcome is efficient.
Proposition 2 (joint profits distribution) In all TSPNE, profits (v1, v2) to firms are in
V =
(
(v1, v2) ∈ R2 :
X
i∈S
vi ≤ vΓ(N)− vΓ(N\S) for all S ∈ 2N
)
. (5)
Proposition 2 reveals that each single firm i receives at most its marginal contribution to joint
profits vΓ(N)− vΓ({j}), i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, and the laboratory appropriates the rest.
Hereafter, an R&D outcome is said to be appropriable when the laboratory obtains (some
share of) the innovation benefits, that is v1 + v2 < vΓ(N), and thus v0 > 0. And an R&D
outcome is not appropriable when firms fully absorb innovation benefits, that is v1+v2 = vΓ(N),
or equivalently v0 = 0. Whether innovation benefits are appropriable or not depends on the
specific forms of post-adoption gross profit functions. The following propositions describe clear-
cut sufficient conditions of (non) appropriation.13
Proposition 3 In all Γ, if vΓ is strictly subadditive, that is vΓ(N) < vΓ({1}) + vΓ({2}), then
in all TSPNE R&D profits are appropriable, that is v0 > 0, and there is a unique vector of
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equilibrium profits, that is
vi = vΓ(N)− vΓ({j}), i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (6)
Proposition 4 In all Γ, if vΓ is superadditive, that is vΓ(N) ≥ vΓ({1}) + vΓ({2}), then in all
TSPNE R&D profits are not appropriable, that is v0 = 0, and all vectors of equilibrium profits
are such that
vi = vΓ(N)− vj , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (7)
The results say that the distribution of innovation benefits between the laboratory and
the two firms is driven by the role of externalities in the production and diffusion of firm-
specific R&D services. Proposition 3 refers to cases in which anti-complementarities (i.e., negative
externalities) dominate. The strict subadditivity of vΓ implies decreasing returns in the size of
the set of users. Consequently, each firm is interested in limiting the number of other users, that
is here in being the only one. Competition for the control of the choice of R&D activities is
tough. This situation is favorable to the laboratory. Proposition 4 characterizes situations in
which complementarities (i.e., positive externalities) prevail. The superadditivity of vΓ implies
increasing returns in the number of users. In that case, each user is interested in seeing the other
firm contract also. Competition for the selection of x by the agent is soft. This is unfavorable to
the laboratory.
Interestingly, whether vΓ is strictly subadditive or (non strictly) superadditive can be checked
by considering mild sufficient conditions on the laboratory’s costs and each firm’s gross profit
function. We show this in the next section.
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4 Applications
The objective of this section is to demonstrate the applicability of the obtained results. We offer
two propositions that facilitate the identification of R&D costs and gross profits specifications
for which vΓ is either strictly subadditive or superadditive.14
Proposition 5 In all Γ, if gi(xi,x00j ) ≤ gi(xi,x0j), all x00j ≥ x0j, and
∂2
∂xki ∂x
l
j
f(x) > 0, (8)
where k, l = 1, . . . , d, such that either i 6= j or (and) k 6= l, then vΓ is strictly subadditive.
In Proposition 5, the condition on gi describes negative direct externalities, and the condition
on f in (8) describes negative indirect externalities. Although stated in terms of cross-derivatives,
the latter condition can be rewritten as f(x0∧x00)+f(x0∨x00)−f(x0)−f(x00) ≥ 0, all x0,x00 ∈ X.
Indeed, differentiability is adopted for notational convenience only, but is not required. The
supermodularity condition formalizes a case of decreasing returns in R&D dimensions on the
laboratory’s side. Supplying more R&D services, as required by a firm, makes it more costly to
serve the other firm. This can be interpreted as a phenomenon of congestion.15
The following examples illustrate this characterization to demonstrate that, in all cases, vΓ
is strictly sub-additive. This means that R&D benefits are appropriable, i.e. the laboratory
earns strictly positive profits.
Example 1 ¤ The vector x = (x1, x2), with Xi = {0, 1}, describes the diffusion possibilities of
a patent attached to some process R&D output, with a “winner-take-all” feature. R&D cost are
f(x) = 0 if x1 = x2 = 0, f(x) > 0 if x1+x2 = 1, and f(x) = +∞ otherwise; a cost specification
borrowed from Laussel and Le Breton (2001). The function f is strictly supermodular in x.
Each firm i’s unit cost is a positive constant ci(xi), with ci(0) = cH and ci(1) = cL < cH .
The two firms produce a homogeneous good, compete in prices, and total demand is q = 1− p.
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We obtain gi(x) = (cH − cL) (1 − cH) > 0 if x = (1, 0), and gi(x) = 0 otherwise. Clearly,
gi(xi, x00j ) ≤ gi(xi, x0j), all x00j ≥ x0j. ¤
Example 2 ¤ R&D costs are f(x) = λ2 (x1 + x2)2, and λ > 0. The quadratic form describes
diseconomies of scale in total efforts, and the two firm-specific R&D services xi, i = 1, 2, are
perfect substitutes from the laboratory’s viewpoint. It follows that ∂2f(x)/∂x1∂x2 = γ > 0. Here
Xi = [0, 1] is a single-dimensional sublattice of R1+. Each user i’s variable costs are normalized
to zero. The algebraic form of demand is borrowed from a model by Poyago-Theotoky (1997),
in which each “specialist” firm produces a good that can be improved on a specific technological
dimension. Demand is qi(p,x) = s
³
1− p−1/xjj xj/(x1 + x2)
´
p−1−1/xii , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, where
s > 0 measures the size of the market, and xi describes a quality improvement embodied in
firm i’s good. Firms compete a` la Bertrand on the product market. Then non-cooperative profit
maximization leads to equilibrium prices p∗i (xi) = 1 + xi. It follows that ∂gj(xj , x−j)/∂xj ≤ 0,
all xi, all s. ¤
Example 3 ¤ As in the previous example, the laboratory’s R&D costs are f(x) = λ2 (x1+x2)2,
with λ > 0, thus f is strictly supermodular in x, with Xi = [0, c], i = 1, 2. The two firms have
variable costs c(x, qi) = (c− xi − βxj)qi, with 0 < c < 1, and β ∈ [0, 1], as in d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988). Fixed costs are k = (1−c)2/9 > 0 (a normalization). A perfectly homogeneous
good is supplied on the final market. The inverse demand curve is p(q) = 1 − qi − qj . Non-
cooperative profit maximization in quantities leads to q∗i (x) = ((1−c)+(2− β)xi−(1− 2β)xj)/3,
and to ∂gi(xi, xj)/∂xj = 2q∗i (x) (2β − 1) /3 ≤ 0, all xi, and for all β ≤ 1/2, that is for “low”
spillovers. ¤
All three examples demonstrate the easy applicability of Proposition 5 to various forms
cost and demand specifications, in attempts to identify the strict subadditivity of vΓ. The
complementary result follows.
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Proposition 6 In all Γ, if gi(xi,x00j ) ≥ gi(xi,x0j), all x00j ≥ x0j, and
∂2
∂xki ∂x
l
j
gi(x) ≥ 0, and
∂2
∂xki ∂x
l
j
f(x) ≤ 0, (9)
k, l = 1, . . . , d, such that either i 6= j or (and) k 6= l, then vΓ is superadditive.
In Proposition 6, the monotonicity condition on gi captures a case of positive direct exter-
nalities. This condition is not sufficient to prove the non appropriability of innovation benefits.
We need complementarities in R&D services, as described by the positive sign of the cross deriv-
atives of gi in the dimensions of x. Similarly, the condition on f captures a case positive indirect
externalities, which says that selecting a higher x, as demanded by a firm, makes it less costly for
the laboratory to satisfy the other firm. Note that, here again, differentiability is not required.
The two displayed expression in (9) can be rewritten as g(x0∧x00)+g(x0∨x00)−g(x0)−g(x00) ≥ 0,
and f(x0 ∧ x00) + f(x0 ∨ x00)− f(x0)− f(x00) ≤ 0, all x0,x00 ∈ X, respectively.
Again, many possible specifications satisfy this characterization. In all examples below, vΓ
is shown to be superadditive, which means that R&D benefits are not appropriable, i.e. the
laboratory exactly breaks even.
Example 4 ¤ The laboratory’s investment is the sum of user-specific expenditures in R&D,
that is f(x) = x1 + x2. Let Xi = {0, x¯}, where x¯ > 0 is a lump-sum expenditure. Each user i’s
variable costs are normalized to zero, and demand is qi(p,x) = 1/(1+γ)−1/(1−γ2)pi+γ/(1−
γ2)pj, where the degree of substitutability γ is a function of innovative efforts, as in Lambertini
and Rossini (1998), that is γ ≡ γ(x) ∈ [0, 1]. R&D aims at enhancing symmetric horizontal
differentiation that occurs only if the two firms buy services from the laboratory. Formally,
let γ(x) < 1 if x1x2 > 0, and γ(x) = 1 otherwise. Non-cooperative profit maximization in
prices in the market stage yields gi(xi, xj) = (1− γ) / (1 + γ) (2− γ)2, and one finds gi(xi, x00j ) ≥
gi(xi, x0j), all x00j ≥ x0j, and gi(x0 ∧ x00) + gi(x0 ∨ x00) ≥ gi(x0) + gi(x00), all x0,x00 ∈ X. ¤
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Example 5 ¤ R&D costs are f(x) = λ2 (x21+x22), where λ > 0 captures the extent of diminishing
returns in R&D on each firm-specific output xi ∈ Xi ⊆ R1+ supplied by the laboratory. Remark
that ∂2f(x)/∂x1∂x2 = 0. Fixed costs are k = (1− γ) /((1 + γ) (2− γ)2) for each user, and
variable costs are zero (a normalization). Demand is qi(p,x) = (1+ xi+ βxj)/(1 + γ)− 1/(1−
γ2)pi + γ/(1 − γ2)pj, where γ ∈ [0, 1] is the degree of substitutability between the two products.
That is, a product innovation results in an increase of the quantity intercept, as in Jensen (1992).
There is Bertrand competition on the product market. Non-cooperative profit maximization leads
to equilibrium prices p∗i (x) = (γ − 1) (γ(1 + βxi + xj) + 2(1 + xi + βxj))/((γ − 2) (γ + 2)). It
is easy to check that ∂gi(xi, xj)/∂xj ≥ 0, and that ∂2gi(xi, xj)/∂xi∂xj ≥ 0, for all parameter
values. ¤
Example 6 ¤ As in the previous example, f(x) = λ2 (x21+x22), with λ > 0, thus R&D costs are
weakly submodular in x. Firm i’s variable costs are c(x, qi) = (c− xi − βxj)qi, with 0 < c < 1,
and β ∈ [0, 1], as in Example 3 adapted from d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). Firms have
fixed costs k = (1−c)2/9 > 0 (a normalization), and produce a perfectly homogeneous good. The
inverse demand curve is p(q) = 1−qi−qj . For all β ≥ 1/2, that is with “high” spillovers, we find
∂gi(xi, xj)/∂xj = 2q∗i (x) (2β − 1) /3 ≥ 0, and ∂2gi(xi, xj)/∂xi∂xj = 2 (2β − 1) (2− β) /9 ≥ 0,
in all final market equilibria. ¤
5 Implications for the Governance of Innovation
The distribution of innovation benefits, which result from the production and diffusion of R&D
services, can be modified either by a horizontal merger of firms, or by a shift to more a more
vertically integrated structure that unifies the laboratory with one of the two firms. The existence
of incentive for more integration depends essentially on the nature of competition on the market
for R&D services, i.e. on the existence of anti-complementarities versus complementarities.
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One situation, however, can be studied independently from the latter considerations, that is
when the laboratory and the two firms all participate in some form of integration. This occurs
if the laboratory acquires the two firms and controls them as subsidiaries, or if the two firms
share the ownership of the laboratory and control it as a joint venture. In these cases, there is
no gain in joint profits to be obtained. To see that, recall that equilibrium R&D outcomes x∗
belong to the set of efforts which yield the highest joint profits for all parties (the joint profits
maximization property). The net residual share of joint profits accruing to each buyer of another
firm’s equity would thus not improve on the amount of net profits received at equilibrium in the
common agency game. Indeed, forward integration (i.e., the two users become subsidiaries) would
imply the payment of vi by the laboratory to the owners of downstream assets. By the same
token, backward integration (i.e., the laboratory becomes a joint venture) would require the total
payment of v0 by firms for the ownership of upstream assets. The equality v0+ v1+ v2 = vΓ(N)
holds in all cases, unless further assumptions are introduced (e.g., cost or demand parameters
could become a function of the governance structure). Now, if the laboratory and the two firms
fully merge (i.e., the two users merge also), firms’ gross profits increase because users become
divisions of a two-product monopolist. However this effect is, in some sense, orthogonal to the
concern of this paper. It is a consequence of a change in the final market only, that does not
relate to the intermediate market for R&D services.
To conclude, one can say that strategic issues on the R&D market never provide incentives to
shift to an integrated structure, in which all firms (the agent and the two principals) participate.
In what follows, we study the incentives to shift to other forms of integration.
5.1 Cases of anti-complementarities
We focus in this section on all cases described in Proposition 3, in which anti-complementarities
in R&D services dominate. Recall that there is a unique equilibrium, and that innovation profits
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are appropriable, i.e. the agent obtains v0 = vΓ(N) − v1 − v2 > 0, and each firm earns its
marginal contribution vi = vΓ(N)− vΓ({j}).
Consider first the impact of a horizontal merger of the two firms on the distribution of
joint profits. There is only one principal left on the intermediate market for technology. It
does not leave any profit to the agent, so that v0 = 0. In addition to gains accruing from the
monopolization of the final market for goods, the positive gains to the merging parties on the
market for R&D are:16
vΓ({1}) + vΓ({2})− vΓ(N) > 0. (10)
Consider now the impact of (partial) vertical integration, where the laboratory merges with
only one out of two users, say firm i. The assumption that firms can choose to source R&D ser-
vices internally, by relying on proprietary resources, leads to discuss two possible cases. Assume
first that firm i is endowed with superior capabilities, that is vi ≥ vΓ({i}). Then the participation
constraint vi > vi in the common agency game leads to vi = vΓ(N)−vΓ({j}) ≥ vΓ({i}), by tran-
sitivity, which contradicts the strict subadditivity property. We can thus assume that the alterna-
tive case holds, in which the laboratory is endowed with superior capabilities, that is vi < vΓ({i}).
In other words, when anti-complementarities dominate, a firm delegates the production of R&D
services to a specialized laboratory only if the latter can compensate for diseconomies in the num-
ber of contracting users by offering a sufficiently high level of expertise. In this context, consider
the situation in which the merged entity does not contract with the other potential user j, a sit-
uation of foreclosure. This choice does not make parties to the merger appropriate a higher level
of joint profits than earned without integrating, that is v0+i = maxx (gi(x)− f(x)) ≡ vΓ({i}).
Indeed, the expression of individual gains vj = vΓ(N) − vΓ({i}), together with the identity
vj = vΓ(N)− vi − v0, lead to the identity vΓ({i}) = v0 + vi. It is therefore not possible for the
laboratory and a user to receive more than the reservation values v0 and vi, respectively, by
simply merging vertically and not serving the outsider with R&D services.
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[insert figure 2 here]
Assume now that, although anti-complementarities dominate, the merged entity sells R&D
services to the separated user j, a situation illustrated by Figure 2. In this case, there is bilateral
bargaining for the choice of x between the integrated party on the one side, and the outsider on
the other side. The pay-off function of the merger is now given by gi(x)−f(x)+ tj (x) while the
payoff function of the separated user remains unchanged as gj(x)− tj (x). Given the lump-sum
transferability of payments, Pareto optimality of the bargaining process induces efficiency of the
bargaining equilibria. In other words,
v0+i + vj = max
x∈X
ÃX
i∈N
gi(x)− f(x)
!
≡ vΓ(N), (11)
where v0+i and vj denote the outcome for the merged pair and the outsider, respectively, in all
bargaining games. Moreover, we know that the integrated structure can, at a minimum, exploit
the laboratory’s capabilities for its own use, and insure for itself the foreclosure outcome. This
guarantees that, at any equilibrium x∗ of the bargaining process:
v0+i = gi(x
∗)− f(x∗) + tj (x∗) ≥ max
x∈X
(gi(x)− f(x)) ≡ vΓ({i}). (12)
As a result, the vertically merged entity cannot be worse-off post integration, including in
the very extreme situation in which it has no bargaining power. Note that the latter claim
implies that foreclosure is always a dominated choice for the integrated structure. The following
proposition summarizes the discussion.
Proposition 7 In all Γ such that vΓ(N) < vΓ({1})+ vΓ({2}), and in all TSPNE, firms which
participate by delegating R&D to the laboratory have strategic incentives to shift to a more, yet
not fully, integrated form of governance. Horizontal integration allows users to extract all profits
from the agent. Vertical integration permits the merged entity to ask the outsider a premium for
the negative externalities it imposes.
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5.2 Cases of complementarities
We focus in this section on all cases described by Proposition 4, in which complementarities
in R&D prevail. Although potential users compete for R&D services through monetary offers,
which truly reflect their needs, the laboratory does not appropriate (any) innovation benefits.
In all equilibria, v0 = 0 and vi + vj = vΓ(N) with vi, vj ≥ 0.
Clearly, since the two users already appropriate all benefits by contracting with the labo-
ratory, and independently from final market considerations, there is no incentive to integrate
horizontally on the intermediate market for technology.
Consider now the (partial) vertical integration of the laboratory with firm i only. Recall
that the reservation profits vi, as obtained by relying on in-house facilities, can be more or less
than vΓ({i}), as gained by firm i when it acquires the external laboratory without contracting
with j, the outsider. First, assume that vi < vΓ({i}). In this case, firm i upgrades its exper-
tise by merging with the external laboratory. Incentives to merge stem from the acquisition of
some exogenously assumed superior ability to supply R&D outputs.17 Of more interest is the
alternative situation in which internal R&D resources are at least as efficient as the common
external laboratory. To see that, assume that vi ≥ vΓ({i}). Then consider first the situation in
which the vertically integrated entity does not contract with the outsider. It obtains a payoff
v0+i = vΓ({i}) to be compared with v0 + vi = vi. We know from Proposition 2 that no firm can
get more than its marginal contribution to the coalition payoff, that is vj ≤ vΓ(N) − vΓ({i}),
and from Proposition 4 that at equilibrium vi = vΓ(N)− vj . As a result:
v0+i = vΓ({i}) ≤ v0 + vi, (13)
hence vertical integration with foreclosure, by forbidding the exploitation of positive externali-
ties, leads merging parties to earn less than by remaining independent and participating in the
agency game.18
Now consider the situation in which the integrated structure sells R&D services to the separate
20
user j. Here again, a bilateral bargaining for the choice of x, between the merged entity which
receives gi(x)−f(x)+ tj (x), and the outsider which obtains gj(x)− tj (x), is substituted for the
common agency game. At equilibrium in the bargaining game, we know that efficiency holds (in
the sense of joint profits maximization), so that v0+i +vj = vΓ(N). The bargaining positions are
such that, either by allocating R&D tasks to the acquired laboratory, or by relying on installed
in-house facilities, the merged entity and the outsider can guarantee an individual payoff of at
least sup(vΓ({i}), vi) = vi and vj , respectively. To compare, at equilibrium in the agency game,
we also have efficiency, that is vi = vΓ(N)− vj , and we know that the participation constraints
of individual firms are vi ≥ vi and vj ≥ vj . It follows that, both in the bargaining and agency
games, we have:
vi ≤ vi ≤ vΓ(N)− vj . (14)
The set of equilibria in the common agency game is thus identical to the set of equilibria
in the bargaining game. This leads to the conclusion that, unless some additional refinement
is introduced that justifies the selection of distinct equilibria in the two games, firms have no
incentive to integrate vertically.
Proposition 8 In all Γ such that vΓ(N) ≥ vΓ({1})+ vΓ({2}), and in all TSPNE, firms which
participate by delegating R&D to the laboratory have no strategic incentive to shift to a more
integrated form of governance.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the understanding of the industrial organization of R&D activities.
In a duopoly set-up with cost-reducing or/and demand-enhancing opportunities, we isolate the
strategic interactions between firms on the market for technology. This is made possible by
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specifying a common agency model, in which firms delegate the production of tailor-made R&D
services to the same laboratory. The model captures many stylized facts that have been ignored
by the literature on license agreements or on R&D cooperation.
Our results rely on a characterization of the structure of the highest joint profit function
vΓ(S), as earned by the laboratory and contracting firms in S. Firstly, when vΓ reflects anti-
complementarities in the dimensions of R&D services, the laboratory appropriates strictly pos-
itive profits in all equilibria (Proposition 3). By contrast, when the structural properties of vΓ
reflect complementarities in R&D dimensions, the two firms absorb all innovation profits in all
equilibria (Proposition 4). We also spell out mild sufficient conditions, on the laboratory’s costs
and firms’ gross profits functions, for the identification of structural properties of vΓ. They make
simple the determination of the laboratory’s ability to appropriate or not innovation benefits,
and the computation of firms’ equilibrium profits (Propositions 5 and 6). The results are illus-
trated by a series of examples adapted from the literature. This contributes to demonstrating
the broad applicability of these sufficient conditions, and also unveils structural features that are
common to seemingly unrelated contributions. Of interest are the consequences of these findings
for the understanding of observed modes of governance of R&D. In substance, we find that, when
anti-complementarities prevail, each delegating firm has strategic incentives to shift to a more
integrated form of governance, either by merging horizontally, or by acquiring the laboratory
(Proposition 7). When complementarities dominate, delegating firms have no strategic incentive
to shift to a more integrated form of governance (Proposition 8).
These results provide an element of explanation for observed real-world choices of governance
of R&D activities. In-house sourcing is more likely to occur in cases characterized by anti-
complementarities in the production and diffusion of R&D results, and separation between a
laboratory and contracting firms is more likely to be observed in cases of complementarities.
This claim contributes to the understanding of inter-industry differences in reported amounts
of contracted out R&D, as mentionned in introduction. It is capable of empirical refutation,
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provided that some proxy can be identified that best describes the mentioned characterization
of in terms of (anti-)complementarities.
This paper is complementary to past contributions for several reasons. Uncertainty in R&D
(as considered by Aghion and Tirole, 1994; or Ambec and Poitevin, 2001) is ruled out to focus
on the effect of conflicting or harmonized requirements by delegating firms on the ability of a
common laboratory to appropriate a share of total benefits. Moreover, the choice of separation
or integration is not assumed to impact the parametric expression of R&D costs. The model
thus economizes on the reference to some exogenous factors, such as difficulties in the sharing of
information between separated stages (the other side to the coin being an assumed easiness in
the diffusion of knowledge in case of integration), in order to rationalize observed changes in the
governance of innovation. This does not suggest that other features (including transaction costs,
private information, or more bargaining power in favour of the laboratory) are not relevant for
the rationalization of the real-world industrial organization of R&D activities. The present con-
tribution has the flavour of a “floor” case, in the sense that the common agency gains, as earned
by a laboratory benefitting from some informational asymmetry, should be bounded from below
by the equilibrium benefits obtained here, other things remaining equal. A natural extension
of the model consists in the introduction of stochastic aspects in the common laboratory’s cost
function.19 We also plan to test whether the obtained results hold when there are more than two
firms.20 Another research path is to focus on a particular choice of algebraic forms, in order to
compare R&D outcomes, firms profits, and welfare, as produced in the common agency set-up,
with the outcomes obtained in more standard games of reference, in which firms conduct R&D
tasks in-house, either non-cooperatively or cooperatively.
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Notes
1A series of contributions have focused the comparison of performances as obtained with alter-
native licensing strategies chosen by an owner of a patented cost-reducing innovation. Kamien,
Oren, and Tauman (1992) compare equilibrium outcomes obtained either with a fixed fee, a per
unit royalty, or the auctioning of a fixed number of licenses to firms in oligopolistic competition
on a final market. By contrast, downstream strategic considerations are ignored by Bousquet,
Cre´mer, Ivaldi, and Wolkowicz (1998), who focus on the risk sharing issue between a patentee
and a single licensee under cost or demand uncertainty. Schmitz (2001) departs from the latter
contributions by focusing on the effects of two downstream firms’ private information about their
benefits on the number of sold licenses at equilibrium. In the present model also, all relevant
information is known by firms, whereas the laboratory need not know downstream cost and de-
mand conditions. We thus adopt the informational specifications of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988), and make possible the comparison of the delegated case with the non-cooperative and
cooperative games of reference, without extending the complete information assumption to the
laboratory.
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2In d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), cooperation in R&D augments equilibrium outputs,
firms’ profits, and social welfare, when technological spillovers are sufficiently high. Kamien,
Muller, and Zang (1992) consider spillovers on the input side of the R&D stage. Suzumura
(1992) introduces a second-best welfare criterion. Vonortas (1994) distinguishes between generic
research and commercial development. Poyago-Theotoky (1999) endogeneizes spillovers. Hin-
loopen (2001) describes a model that encompasses most specific forms of the literature.
3In this paper, we interchangeably use the terms “outsourcing”, “externalization”, “contract-
ing out”, and “delegation”, in order to refer to some “work of innovatory nature undertaken
by one party on behalf of another under conditions laid out in a contract agreed formally be-
forehand”, together with other engineering services that include design and prototyping, as in
Howells (2000, p. 18).
4See NSF (2002, Table A10). Quoted figures refer to the industrial R&D performed outside
company facilities and funded from all sources except the Federal Government. Estimates do not
include industrial funding of R&D as undertaken at universities and colleges and other nonprofit
organizations. The amounts of contracted out R&D for firms with 25,000 employees or more are
1,974 in 1997, 2,446 in 1998, and 3,128 in 1999 (in millions of dollars).
5These stylized facts are well documented by the literature at the cross-roads of economics
and management science. As far as uncertainty is concerned, Jorde and Teece (1990) describe
R&D as a constituent part of the innovation process, “an activity in which ’dry holes’ and ’blind
alleys’ are the rule, not the exception” (p. 76). Helfat (1994) presents evidence from the U.S.
petroleum industry in support to the claim that much corporate R&D is firm-specific, because
it “often entails alterations and enhancements to existing firm assets, production processes,
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and products” (p. 173). Dobler and Burt (1996) refer to the case of software development
to illustrate the general observation that “R&D services normally are purchased through one
of the two methods of compensation: a fixed price for a level of effort (e.g., fifty days) or a
cost plus fixed or award fee” (p. 416). Using a dataset for Belgian firms, Veugelers (1997)
provides evidence for know-how sourcing in proprietary laboratories and external sourcing to
be simultaneously combined at the firm level, and observes that, when in-house facilities are
available, “the capacity to go for it alone increases a firm’s bargaining power in negotiating
with external partners” (p. 304). Argyres and Liebeskind (2002) contribute to explaining the
superior bargaining power of large pharmaceutical, agribusiness, and chemical firms, which tap
R&D services on the intermediate market for biotechnology. The authors evoke a high rate
of entry on the supply side of the market only, the resulting small size and large number of
independent laboratories, the tight financial constraints they face, and their inability to enter
the downstream manufacturing stage.
6Examples that motivate the analysis are many in the pharmaceuticals and medicines indus-
try (in the sense of the North American Industry Classification System), for which the amounts
of contracted out R&D are above all other industries. From 1993 on, Vertex, a U.S.-based private
laboratory in the biotechnology sector, has signed multi-annual contracts with GlaxoSmithK-
line, Eli Lilly, Schering, Aventis, and Novartis, among other firms, for the completion of some
well-defined R&D tasks. In the chemical industry, Symyx has signed multi-annual contracts with
Bayer in 1999, and with ICI in 2000, and receives payments by providing access to a proprietary
high speed combinatorial technology. The objective is to provide firm-specific R&D outputs
in the form of high value speciality polymers and related applications. In the microelectronic
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sector, Ovonyx was formed in 1999 and is engaged in the R&D of electrical characteristics of
phase-change memory storage mechanisms. It develops and commercializes a thin-film non-
volatile semiconductor memory device, a technology which can potentially be used in embedded
applications in many areas, usually referred to as “system-on-chip solutions”. The laboratory,
which remains independent, does not only derive its income from licence fees for patented items,
but also from service fees based on the development of new applications as contracted out by
firms, including Intel and STMicroelectronics. In the economics and technology management
literature, the exploitation of economies of scale comes on top of a list of non-mutually exclusive
motivations for the external sourcing of R&D, including the resolution of a shortage in resources,
the focus on core programs in-house, the opportunity to transfer fixed costs to variable costs,
and the sharing of risks. For a recent survey, see Narula (2001).
7In the terminology of Laffont and Martimort (1997), indirect externalities are of “type 1”,
and direct externalities of “type 2”.
8By referring to “services”, we interpret R&D efforts as an output. However, they can be
also seen as an input, that is as a pecuniary investment in several activities by the laboratory.
In section 4, examples of specific algebraic forms illustrate the two possible interpretations.
9A set Xi ⊂ Rd+ is a sublattice of Rd+ if x0i,x00i ∈ Xi implies that x0i∧x00i ∈ Xi and x0i∨x00i ∈ Xi,
where x0i∧x00i ≡ (inf(x1i 0, x1i 00), . . . , inf(xdi 0, xdi 00)) and x0i∨x00i ≡ (sup(x1i 0, x1i 00), . . . , sup(xdi 0, xdi 00)).
10The choice of net profit functions is similar to that considered by Cre´mer and Riordan
(1987) for the modelling of multilateral transactions with bilateral contracts, but with transfer
payments that are here contingent on the laboratory’s choice of R&D services in X.
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11Assume that firms 1 and 2 decide not to benefit from the resources of a common laboratory,
and rather to source R&D services exclusively from one or the other alternative to lab 0. Then
the assumption that users write contracts with complete information implies that each laboratory
exactly breaks even. In that case, a firm obtains as much from the independent laboratory as it
would receive by owning it.
12Propositions 1 and 2 are restatements of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) adapted to our
context. Proofs in the notation of the present paper are available upon request.
13The two propositions are simple applications of a series of theorems by Laussel and Le
Breton (2001). Proposition 3 results from the observation that if vΓ is strictly subadditive, then
it is not balanced. Therefore from Theorem 3.1 (p. 102) the agent obtains a rent, that is
v0 > 0, and from Theorem 3.3 (p. 104) we have vi = vΓ(N) − vΓ({j}), i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Proposition 4 results from the observation that if vΓ is superadditive, then it is convex. It
follows from Theorem 3.2 (p. 103) that in all equilibria the agent obtains no rent, that is v0 = 0.
Together with v0+ v1+ v2 = vΓ(N), from Proposition 1 (joint profits maximization), this yields
vi = vΓ(N) − vi, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. The theorems, in the notation of the present, paper are
available upon request.
14The proofs of Propositions 5 and 6 are adapted in the notation only from Billette de Ville-
meur and Versaevel (2002), and available upon request.
15Note that it can however be more profitable for the laboratory to contract with several firms.
16When firms shift from duopoly competition to a two-product monopoly, the merger also
results in higher gains on the final market stage. This applies independently from changes that
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occur on the market for technology.
17For empirically grounded accounts on efficiency gains as a motive for vertical integration
between R&D and production stages, see Armour and Teece (1978), Pisano (1989, 1991), and
Oxley (1997).
18Remark that we cannot have vi = v({i}) and vj = v({j}) since vi + vj = v({1, 2}) >
v({1})+v({2}), by assumption. So that vertical integration with foreclosure is at most indifferent
for one of the firms (and strictly worse for the other).
19Arguably, a model by Laussel and Le Breton (1998), with which we share most specifications,
offers a natural extension to the non-deterministic case. In this model, the laboratory’s cost
would become µf(x), where µ is a positive random variable. The agent does not know the
realization of the random variable before accepting or refusing the principals’ proposals (i.e.,
strategies ti(x) in our notation, i = 1, 2), but has learned it before deciding its multi-dimensional
effort level (i.e., x).
20The extension to the n-firm case, with n > 2, involves most difficulties in the case of anti-
complementarities. Indeed the strict subadditivity of vΓ, as mentioned in Propositions 3, 5, and
6, should be substituted for a more demanding characterization, namely the strong subadditivity
property, as defined by Laussel and Le Breton (2001, p. 104).
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Figure 1: Firms 1 and 2 source R&D services x1,x2 from lab 0, in exchange of transfer payments
t1(x), t2(x), and sell quantities q1, q2 at prices p1, p2 to earn v1, v2, respectively.
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Figure 2: Firm 1 acquires the laboratory. The merged entity sells R&D services to the separate
user 2.
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